-3-

evidence as to the dangerous character of the old triple-point release as well as data on the experience of the Royal Air Force, and the 8th U.S. Air Force with the single-point release. Their recommendation that a strong letter be sent to Army Air Forces and the Bureau of Aeronautics went unheeded.

Captain Louis B. Olson, U.S. Coast Guard, assigned as Officer in charge of the Emergency Rescue Equipment Section and directly responsible for its operation to Admiral Furer, finally conferred with the Admiral on or about November 19, 1943, at which time the Admiral signed a modified letter, extremely mild in tone, recommending that consideration be given to the adoption of this equipment by the Bureau of Aeronautics.

In spite of the evidence which Admiral Furer had before him at that time in the form of a Memorandum from Brigadier General Longfellow of the 8th Air Force under date of June 1, 1943, consisting of four typewritten pages of incontrovertible argument for the quick-release (copy attached), he did not take any steps to bring this matter forcefully to the attention of the Materiel Command of the Army Air Forces.

Analysis of current conditions surrounding the procure-ment of this equipment strongly indicates that the present attitude is largely due to the failure of Admiral Furer to accept responsibility under Memorandum No. 58 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Forceful action on this particular matter of the parachute

SECRET